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Résumé – 
Les  normes  de  travail  définies  par  l’OIT  en  1998  sont  universelles  mais  très 
différemment appliquées dans les pays. Elles sont d’autant mieux respectées que les 
pays disposent d’un revenu élevé. Néanmoins la causalité entre les normes de travail et 
la  croissance  reste  une  question  controversée.  Les  stratégies  de  croissance  par  les 
exportations peuvent inciter les pays en développement à contenir la progression des 
normes de travail d’une part pour accroître leur dotation en travail non qualifié et ainsi 
renforcer leur avantage comparatif relativement aux pays qui les respectent, d’autre part 
à mener des stratégies de « dumping social » qui visent à accroître plus directement la 
compétitivité. Nous utilisons un modèle de gravité en coupe pour évaluer l’impact du 
niveau de respect des normes de travail sur le commerce en distinguant d’une part les 
effets  bilatéraux  sur  la  spécialisation  géographique  et,  d’autre  part,  les  effets  sur 
l’ouverture  aux  exportations  et  aux  importations.  Nous  montrons  que,  toutes  choses 
égales par ailleurs, les pays qui respectent les normes de travail tendent à échanger 
davantage avec les pays qui ne respectent pas les normes de travail qu’entre eux, alors 
que les pays qui ne les respectent pas tendent à échanger davantage entre eux. Ces effets 
jouent surtout sur le travail des enfants et la liberté d’association. De même, toutes 
choses égales par ailleurs, les pays qui respectent les normes de travail, tendent à être 
moins ouverts que les pays qui ne les respectent pas mais de manière différente selon les 
normes avec une relation non-linéaire pour certaines d’entre elles (travail des enfants, 
travail forcé).   
Abstract – 
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Labour  standards  defined  by  the  ILO  in  1998  are  universal  but  applied  very 
differently  in  countries.  They  are  much  better  respected  in  high  income  countries. 
However, the causality between labour standards and growth remains a controversial 
issue.  The  strategies  of  export-led  growth  might  encourage  developing  countries  to 
contain  the  rising  process  of  standards,  first  to  increase  their  unskilled  labour 
endowments  for  strengthening  their  comparative  advantage  relative  to  complying 
countries, and then  to pursue strategies of "social dumping", which aim more directly at 
increasing  competitiveness.  We  use  a  gravity  model  to  assess  the  trade  impact  of 
pushing back the level of compliance with labour standards  in distinguishing one hand 
the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) and, secondly, the effects on 
the  export and import openness. We show that, other things being equal, countries that 
meet  the  standards  of  work  tend  to  trade  more  with  no-complying  countries,  while 
countries that do not respect standards tend to trade more each other. These effects are 
mainly identified on child labour and freedom of association. Similarly, all other things 
being equal, countries that meet labour standards, tend to be less open than countries 
that do not comply but in different ways according to the standards with a non-linear 
relationship for some of them (child labour, forced labour). 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
ILO's "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights" (1998) defines four core 
standards, embodied in eight conventions. These rights are considered to be universal 
and  must  apply  to  all  people  and  all  Nations,  regardless  of  the  level  of  economic 
development.  This  Declaration  was  inspired  by  the  World  Summit  for  Social 
Development  in  Copenhagen  (1995),  which  included  seven  Agreements.  Since  little 
protection against child labour was included in the existing ILO conventions, a new 
convention was added to cover its worst forms (Convention 182). The four core labour 
standards, embodied in eight conventions, are:  
Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 
98);  
Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Conventions 29 and 105);  
Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (Conventions 
100 and 111);  
Recommended  minimum  age  for  child  workers  (Convention  138)  and  the  worst 
forms of child labour (Convention 182).  
There is a consensus as regards the positive correlation between the quality of labour 
standards and the level of development. Income per inhabitant would be one of the 
drivers of compliance with core labour standards (Casella, 1996; Busse, 2004; Arestoff 
and  Granger  2003).  Bazillier  (2008)  confirms  the  positive  impact  of  core  labour 
standards on long-run growth. However, the direction of causality and the channels of 
transmission are still discussed. 
If it is largely considered that “growth is good for labour standards”. However, this 
assertion  is  not  enlightening.  It  is  based  on  cross-section  analysis  with  a  long-run 
perspective and nothing is said about the influence of labour standards on growth. If low 
labour standards impede growth, we cannot expect an improvement of labour standards 
attesting the initial assertion.  
Endogenous  growth  models  thus  emphasize  the  positive  role  of  accumulating 
production  factors,  especially  human  factors  (Lucas,  1988;  Romer,  1989).  In  these 
models, the long-run growth rate increases the greater the amount of time devoted to 4 
 
training and decreases the more priority is given to profits in the present. Child labour 
and inadequate health and safety conditions also combine to push down the rate of 
accumulation of human capital and, consequently, future growth rates. Even, the various 
forms of violating labour standards are aimed at and result in lowering the cost of labour 
and paying for it below the equilibrium price (marginal productivity of labour), which 
maintains under-productivity  and, consequently, under-development.  Low capitalistic 
processes provide little incentive to the employer to invest in order to increase labour 
productivity.  According  to  Piore  (1994),  low  investment  is  a  way  of  avoiding 
geographical concentration, which leads to dispersed industry and makes monitoring 
work conditions more complicated. Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) believe that upholding 
workers'  rights  facilitates  coordination  and  increases  productivity  by  reducing  the 
effects of labour/management conflict on production and helping small open economies 
to adjust more rapidly to economic shocks and this at the lowest possible cost. Martin 
and Maskus (2001) show that, if the markets are competitive, it is more likely that 
freedom  of  association  will  increase  production  and  competitiveness  by  improving 
productivity.  The  freedom  of  association  and  collective  bargaining  are  also  often 
preferred  to  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  wage,  which  may  lead  to  higher  adult 
unemployment and a higher level of child labour (Basu, 2000; Dinopoulos and Zhao, 
2007). 
Trade openness must be included in the chain of causality. Some authors locate trade 
openness at the beginning of the process (Griswold, 2001): the best way to improve 
labour  standards  would  be  to  encourage  growth  assumed  being  stimulated  by  open 
trade. In this case, we speak of "endogenous" development of labour standards: opening 
up trade encourages growth and income which in turn helps to reduce poverty, raise real 
wages and improve the respect of labour standards. Any measure that would result in 
the decline of international trade would therefore be counter-productive. However, these 
predictions do not help to explain the persistence of differences in the levels of labour 
standards  in  countries  with  similar  income  levels.  Neither  has  any  immediate  or 
significant  improvement  been  observed  in  the  level  of  standards  in  high-growth 
countries (India and China).  
The virtuous “endogenous” process assumes compliance with two hypotheses: trade 
openness stimulates growth and growth leads to improved labour standards. 5 
 
During the 1990s, many studies served to consolidate the first link in the chain of 
causality: opening up trade encourages growth (Edwards, 1992, 1998; Dollar, 1992; Ben 
David, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Ades and Glaeser, 1999). This causality has 
nonetheless been challenged by methodological criticism, notably by Rodriguez and 
Rodrik  (2000),  who  highlight  the  difficulty  of  measuring  openness.  If  trade  has  an 
influence on growth, the opposite may equally be true.  
Nonetheless,  subsequent  studies  tend  to  confirm  a  positive  relation:  Frankel  & 
Romer (1999) find that an increase in the ratio between trade and GDP of 1% would 
push up income per inhabitant by 0.5% to 2%. In any case, this relation is more likely to 
be due to the "exogenous" geographical characteristics of a country than to trade policy 
(see also Irwin & Tervio, 2002). Although there is a pretty strong assumption regarding 
the causal nature of foreign trade, the connection with trade liberalisation policies is 
therefore less certain (nonetheless, see Wacziarg & Welsh, 2008). These cross-section 
studies cannot exclude the existence of "outliers", in other words, countries that diverge 
from this trend. They do not therefore exclude different levels of sensibility between 
growth and trade in different countries depending upon a combination of criteria, such 
as geography or institutions (Rodrik ed., 2003). 
Furthermore, we have also to consider the direct link between labour standard and 
trade, which might jeopardize the assumed virtuous indirect link transiting by growth.  
Many  authors  emphasise  the  possible  negative  effects  of  globalisation  on  certain 
social standards, especially as regards child labour. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) the 
gradual relaxation of the rice export quota increased the relative price of this product 
and therefore the income of the rural population and the decline of child labour in rural 
areas.  
According to Busse (2004), opening up trade significantly reduces discrimination 
against women and child labour. On the other hand, its impact on forced work and 
union  rights  is  more  ambiguous.  However,  Arestoff  and  Granger  (2003)  show  that 
opening  up  trade  has  a  negligible  effect  on  the  composite  indicator  regarding 
compliance with the ILO's four core labour standards. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) 
find  a  negative  relationship  from  trade  to  child  labour,  which  becomes  statistically 
insignificant when cross-country income differences are controlled.  6 
 
Inversing  the  causality,  labour  standards  might  also  determine  trade.  Export-led 
growth  strategies  make  pressure  on  labour  cost  and  might  drive  to  lowering  labour 
standards or significant lags on the pace of potential improvement due to the growth.  
The paper aims to explore this causal link between the compliance of core labour 
standard and trade. The question is at the core of the debate on the inclusion of a social 
clause in trade agreements. While the Singapore Conference of the WTO has denied any 
link between labour and trade, highlighting a significant relationship would question 
this  assertion.  A  positive  relationship  between  non-compliance  with  core  labour 
standards  and  exports  would  confirm  an  incentive  to  lower  labour  standards  for  a 
competitive matter. 
2.  THEORETICAL ISSUES AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Many studies are based on a usual HOS theory. Increasing unskilled labour force in 
countries where this factor is relatively abundant deepens the comparative advantage 
and  drives  to  higher  trade  with  developed  countries  having  the  opposite  factor 
endowment.  However,  increase  in  exports  of  goods  intensive  in  low-skilled  labour 
might cause a degradation of the terms of trade (see, for example, Brown, Deardorff and 
Stern, 1996) 
If the non-compliances with certain core labour standards, such as child labour and 
forced labour, allows intensive use of the workforce (child labour, prison labour, etc.), 
the short-term effects on employment and growth might be attenuated by substituting 
one labour category for another. Assuming that child labour and adult labour are totally 
interchangeable, the use of child labour may entail a proportion of the adult labour force 
being excluded from the market (Basu and Van, 1998; Hansson, 1981; Granger, 2003) 
Similarly, forced labour might be alternatively used to free labour and, therefore would 
have an undetermined effect on endowments.  
The positive, even ambiguous, effect of child and forced labour on unskilled labour 
endowments might be counter-balanced by the violation of other labour standards. If 
discrimination prevents certain categories of the population from having access to work, 
it affects the quantity of labour used in production. It also creates rigidity and affects 
productivity, thus preventing a more effective allocation of resources (Brown, Deardorff 
and Stern, 1996; Maskus, 1997; OECD 1996).  7 
 
The role played by freedom of association and collective bargaining rights is the 
most  highly  challenged  aspect,  mainly  due  to  the  effects  of  “closed  shop”  unions, 
widely  thought  of  as  negative,  in  some  Latin  American  countries  (Elliott,  2003). 
Nonetheless, the unions' legitimacy usually lies in the challenge they  present to the 
excessive and abusive powers of employers, which are often inadequately regulated by 
the public authorities and advantaged by other core standard violations, such as forced 
labour and child labour. The monopsonic behaviour of the employers leads to the labour 
being underpaid (Granger, 2003; Martin and Maskus, 1999; Morici and Shulz, 2001; 
Shelburne, 2004). The firms that have the advantage of a monopoly over recruitment 
can  ration  out  their  labour  demand,  and,  therefore,  production  and  exports,  to  put 
pressure on the price of labour.  
Another link is the competitive pressure of labour costs in other countries. "Social 
dumping", a term subject to some controversy, may be defined as an impingement of 
workers' rights applied for the purposes of boosting competitiveness, in both the import 
and export markets alike.  It is thus a means of putting pressure on wage  costs and 
production costs. A strict definition would imply that such an impingement refers to 
"normal"  practice  in  the  producing  country:  violation  of  national  laws,  exemptions 
granted  to  certain  export  industries.  A  country  initiating  "social  dumping"  practices 
might trigger a race-to-the-bottom process e.g. a prisoner’s dilemma process. This does 
not so much involve North-South trade as South-South trade, given that countries in the 
South are rivals competing in the international market for similar sectors (Elliott, 2003): 
the  repercussions  of  social  dumping  by  an  exporting  country  are  actually  felt  more 
intensely  in  the  countries  with  similar  comparative  advantages  and  specialisations 
(textile-garment industry). One consequence is the increasing risk of deteriorated terms 
of trade making more uncertain the expected increase of the value of exports. 
Finally, lowering labour standards may contribute to influence trade by two channels 
at least: change in unskilled labour endowments and an increasing gap between labour 
productivity and labour costs.  
Because theory is ambiguous, only empirical studies might settle the issue. Early 
studies showed the absence of correlation between labour standards and the volume of 
trade (OECD, 1996, 2000; Mah, 1997; Raynauld and Vidal, 1998) but they did not use 
reliable indicators. The number of ILO conventions ratified by a country is the most 
frequently used indicator in empirical studies (Rodrik, 1998; Busse, 2003; Cooke & 8 
 
Noble, 1998). Because of a gap between the content of conventions and their effective 
application, this indicator must be considered with caution (Chau & Kanbur, 2001).  
Rodrik (1998) shows that timework and child labour contribute to a higher share of 
labour-intensive exports in total exports. Van Beers (1998) finds that labour standards 
influence trade in 18 OECD countries. Granger (2005) has built her own indicators on 
the four core labour standards and concludes that violation by Southern countries tends 
to raise the volume of North-South trade. These last studies confirm the existence of a 
trade-labour linkage.  
Many empirical and econometric studies focus on the specific case of freedom of 
association  and  collective  bargaining,  and  its  impact  on  trade  and  economic 
performance.  They  show  that  collective  bargaining  improves  overall  economic 
competitiveness  (see,  for  example,  Aidt  and  Tzannatos,  2002;  Martin  and  Maskus, 
2001). Nonetheless, the estimates by Galli and Kucera (2004) fail to reveal any definite 
connection between upholding union rights and exports of labour-intensive goods. 
So far, the question has been tackled from a unilateral point of view: do countries 
observing core labour standards trade more with the world? However, trade relations 
concern couples of countries and are influenced by bilateral trade costs such as tariffs, 
transport  and  insurance  costs.  Moreover,  the  observance  of  labour  standards  might 
influence  these  trade  costs  for  various  reasons.  Current-preferential  agreement 
negotiations include labour standards provisions. Following Bagwell & Staiger (1998), 
two respectful countries should conclude more reciprocal tariff reductions, which imply 
lower trade costs. However, the respect of labour standards is costly and might impede 
exports,  especially  towards  countries  importing  labour-intensive  and  high  price-
elasticity goods. Implementation of multinational firms in low-ranked countries to serve 
world markets might be detrimental to trade between high-ranked countries.  
Our empirical study aims to verify whether and how labour standards affect bilateral 
trade. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The hypothesis derived from the factor endowment theory is that countries violating 
labour standards, which actually concerns labour-abundant countries, should increase 
their relative endowment in unskilled labour trade with countries respecting them. The 
“social dumping” hypothesis is that the same countries should trade more with the rest 9 
 
of the world than complying countries (all thing being equal), although the race-to-the-
bottom effect is supposed to reduce the competitive advantage expected by the firms 
and countries.  
A good framework is the Anderson and van Wincoop's specification of the gravity 
model. Gravity models predict bilateral trade by the product of national incomes (GDP) 
and the distance between partners. Distance is a proxy for transport costs and the model 
may  be  "augmented"  by  other  variables  affecting  bilateral  trade  costs.  The  model 
proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce country fixed effects (export 
and import), which capture all unilateral effects as level of development or remoteness 
and reduce the risk of endogeneity. They also impose unit income elasticities and the 
product of GDPs is then considered as a denominator of the independent variable, which 
is expressed in logarithm. The advantage is to circumvent two difficulties: co linearity 
with country fixed effects and a plausible endogeneity with trade variables.  
In a monopolistic competition framework, with full and exclusive specialisation (one 
variety, one country) where consumers have a CES preference function with a common 































j " ∑P =
- - - s s s q
(2) 
s s s q










Where Xij are the exports from country i to country j, Yi et Yj are levels of GDP, Yw is 
world GDP, θi is the income share of country i, and tij are costs associated to trade from 
country i to country j (tij.≥ 1) With the symmetry of trade costs (tij = tji), Пi = Pi and 






















From this theoretical foundations, empirical investigations usually proxies for trade 
costs and include other variables acting on bilateral trade (augmented variables). Price 
indexes Pi and Pj are "multilateral resistance" terms. They summarize the average trade 10 
 
resistances  between  a  country  and  all  its  trading  partners.  Taking  account  the 
complexity  of  nonlinear  techniques  estimation  of  prices,  export  and  import  country 
fixed  effects  are  usually  used  to  quantify  "multilateral  resistance"  in  a  way  that 
integrates  omitted  variables  and  makes  possible  the  isolation  of  "bilateral"  and 
"unilateral" effects of institutional variables (Feenstra, 2004).  
The equation to estimate is then 
Log (Xij/YiYj) = a1Log(Dij)+  ijk
k






i iDE a +∑
j
j jDI a +ij              [5] 
Dij = distance between i and j ; ijk = a k-vector considering a mutual characteristic 
(language, border, trade agreement, factor endowment…). 
       ijk' = the k' bilateral variables of interest ; 
       DEi (DIj) = export (import) fixed effects (dummy variable).  
       ij =  error term respecting the usual conditions.  
However, this choice leads to an additional issue in cross section: unilateral variables 
such as income or the level of labour standards are perfectly collinear with country 
(export  and  import)  fixed  effects.  Then,  we  can  only  introduce  bilateral  (dyadic) 
variables. Bilateral trade between two countries are a function of differences in factor 
endowments, hypothetically influenced by the respect of labour standards. Due to the 
fact  that  all  developed  countries,  which  are  also  skilled-labour  abundant,  have  high 
labour standards with few deviations, we can introduce a measure of the heterogeneity 
in regard of respect of labour standards. If the violation of labour standards increases the 
endowment in unskilled labour, we expect a positive relation between bilateral trade and 
the  measure  of  heterogeneity.  By  acting  in  this  way,  we  also  reduce  the  risk  of 
endogeneity by causality bias, because the respect of labour standards in one country 
cannot be considered as the consequence of trade relations with another country. Only 
few  bilateral  agreements  impose  "social  clauses"  with  very  debatable  effectiveness 
(Siroën and alii, 2008). 
In  a  second  step,  the  effect  of  the  labour  standard  index  on  the  overall  trade, 
hypothetically due to a “social dumping” strategy can be estimated by regressing the 11 
 
fixed  effects  variables  with  country-specific  variables,  including  the  indicator  of 
compliance with labour standards. 
The  second  econometric  issue  deals  directly  with  the  empirical  methods  used  to 
estimate gravity equations. There is a long tradition of log-linearizing (Equation 5) and 
estimating the variables of interest by OLS. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
show that heteroskedasticity is a frequently underestimated issue for gravity models, 
even when a  Huber-White estimator is used. OLS-estimated  elasticities can then be 
highly  misleading.  To  bypass  these  problems,  Santos  Silva  and  Tenreyro  (2006) 
advocate testing trade variables in levels, i.e., to test Xij instead of Log (Xij), and using a 
robust  Poisson  Pseudo-Maximum  Likelihood  (PPML)  estimator  because  it  produces 
estimates  that  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  (Winkelmann,  2003).  This  method  of 
estimation  also  permits  taking  into  account  zero  trade  because  the  Log(0)  issue 
disappears. However, to consider nil values does not deal with the issue of censored 
variables (Xij cannot be negative). The zero-inflated Poisson regression (ZIP) we use 
has the feature of specifying an equation that determines whether the observed trade 
flow is zero or not. 
So, the second type of equation to estimate is  
Xij = a1Log(Dij)+  ijk
k
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4.  DATA 
The information on bilateral exports comes from the International Monetary (IMF, 
Direction of Trade Statistics). Data on GDP are extracted from the World Bank’s World 
Development  Indicators.  Distance  (distij)  is  the  great  arc  circle  kilometric  distance 
between the two capitals of countries i and j (CEPII database). Contiguity (contigij) and 
colonial ties are also taken from CEPII’s "Distance" database. The Common language 
data are from CIA World Factbook. Dummies indicating a common membership in a 
preferential trade agreement (agreementij) are from the WTO database.  
We  have  a  problem  with  the  usual  variables  of  common  language  and  common 
colonial link. First, in multilingual countries it is sometimes arbitrary to determine the 
common  language  and,  second,  there  is  an  obvious  link  between  language  and 
colonizer. So, we use  a new variable  called  “cultural distance”  (culdistij) taking the 
value 1 when two countries share the same language (at least one language considered 
as official by the CIA database) and/or had a colonizer-colonized link.  
Because we consider the contribution of labour standard to labour endowment as a 
channel of transmission, we must control relative factor endowments. We use as a proxy 
the difference between GDP per capita :  
factorendij = MaxGDPpercapita/MinGDP per capita. 
Few  databases  include  the  respect  of  labour  standards  as  defined  by  the  ILO’s 
declaration. Some consider the laws regardless of their implementation. Others focus on 
other social aspects (minimum wage, for example)1 or only certain standards. Papers 
have previously used the Granger’s database (Granger, 2003, 2005; Granger and Siroën, 
2010),  which  separately  scores  each  core  labor  standard  (child  labor,  forced  labor, 
discrimination, union rights) from 1 (total violation) to 4 (total respect). The coding 
method is based on the exploitation of a large amount of qualitative and quantitative 
information  from  various  sources,  such  as  ILO,  US  Department  of  Labor,  US 
Department of State, NGOs reports.  
However the Granger’s database scored only 65 countries, the limitation being due to 
a choice giving a priority to diversified sources. Bazillier (2007) prefers to expand the 
                                                 
1 See, OECD (1996), Rodrik (1996), Mah 1997, Van Beers (1998) 13 
 
sample to 155 countries, left to reduce the sources used for scoring. He uses similar 
method of scoring for the same period (end of 90s). The index quotes the four core 
labour standards + the number of ratified ILO’s conventions, from 1 (total compliance) 
to 5 (total disrespect). He uses the MCA (Multiple Correspondence Analysis) method to 
build an aggregated index. Bazillier shows a high correlation between its own indicator 
and the Granger’s one. Applying systematically the same methods of aggregation for 
the same countries and even if parameters are quite different, we verified they give 
similar results. We can consider that differences should be due to the size of the sample, 
not to serious differences in the assessment of compliance with labour standards.  
However, the  Bazillier’s index has been rebuilt.  Indeed,  we have chosen to only 
consider the compliance, not the official laws, regulations or international conventions. 
For example, USA have ratified only 14 conventions (only 2 of the eight “core” ILO’s 
conventions)  and  Myanmar...19.  From  the  Bazillier’s  database,  we  use  the  same 
weighting method (MCA) to obtain a new aggregated index (Agindex) excluding the 
ratification of conventions. 
We use this index to introduce the “social distance” between i and j in the equation : 
socdistij = 1 + │Agindexi – Agindexj│(one is added to avoid the nil value for equally 
scored countries). 
However, the social index only gauges social heterogeneity whatever the level of 
labour practices. A couple of countries violating labour standards will have the same 
value as a couple of complying countries. We then introduce two dummies variables: 
respectij taking the value 1 when the couple of countries complies labour standards (if 
Agindex  >0.75  in  i  and  j)  and  norespectij  when  it  does  not  (Agindex  ≤  0.75).  The 
reference is the heterogeneous case: one country complies and not the other one. The 
hypothesis of factor endowment lets to expect a negative sign for the two variables. 
5.  EVIDENCES 
We first consider the bilateral effect of the compliance with labour standards e.g. the 
factor endowment effect. 
From (6) we estimate bilateral exports with usual variables of geographic distance 
(distij),  common  border  (contigij),  trade  agreement  (agreementij),  cultural  distance 
(culdistij), economic distance (factorendij) and our variables of interest. We use three 
methods of estimation: LSO (“pure” Anderson and van Wincoop specification with unit 14 
 
income-elasticities  and  excluding  nil  values),  PPML  (including  nil  values)  and  ZIP 
(filtering nil values). 
We first (table 1, column 1 to 3) test the indicator of social distance (socdistij), which 
is  never  significant.  Note  that  the  indicator  of  factor  endowment  (factorendij)  is 
significantly  negative  in  LSO  (col.  1)  but  significantly  positive  in  the  two  other 
estimations more economically distant countries significantly (5%) trade more.  
The  absence  of  social  distance  effect  might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  factor 
endowment hypothesis differently acts when the couple complies with labour standards 
and when the couple violates them. We then introduce respectij and norespectij, which 
are defined above. The full validation of the factor endowment hypothesis would imply 
two negative signs because the reference is the heterogeneous case (one complies, the 
other not), which is assumed to increase differences in relative factor endowment. The 
three  methods  of  estimation  gives  similar  results  even  if  coefficients  are  more 
significant in LSO. columns 3 (PPML) and 4 (ZIP) show that the factor endowments 
hypothesis is not invalidated for complying countries: a couple of countries having high 
labour standards will trade more each other than with countries practicing low labour 
rights.  Adversely,  violating  countries  export  more  with  complying  ones  (norespectij 
negative). If these results highly mitigate the factor endowment hypothesis, it gives the 
social dumping hypothesis a chance. 
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**  agreementij 













(2.24)  (2.20)  (1.93)  (4.04)  (1.98)  (1.68) 
-0.036  0.054  0.046       
socdistij 
(0.34)  (0.40)  (0.34)       
      2.163**  1.036*  1.010* 
respectij 
      (2.47)  (1.83)  (1.78) 






1.117**  norespectij 











**  Constant 
(55.21)  (6.91)  (7.01)  (47.92)  (13.93)  (14.11) 
R
2  0.43      0.43     
Wald Chi2      110798      109237 
Observatio
ns 
12772  17465  17,465  12772  17,465  17,465 
Country 
fixed-effects 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** : 1%; ** : 5%; *** : 10% 16 
 
In the theoretical part of the paper we stressed the fact that, even if child labour or 
forced labour are expected to increase the endowment in unskilled labour, standards had 
controversial effects for two main reasons: the substitution effects (for example, child 
labour might decrease demand for adults and mitigate the expected increasing effect) 
and the nature of the violation (for example, the restrictive monopsonistic demand for 
labour in absence of trade unions). 
Table  2  gives  the  coefficient  of  the  previous  variables  of  interest  (the  other 
coefficients are hardly affected), which are disaggregated to the level of each labour 
standard. Results are only given for ZIP estimations. 17 
 
Table  2  –  Effects  of  each  labour  standards  on  bilateral  exports  (ZIP) 
 
 
First  ZIP 
equation 
Second ZIP equation 
  Social distance 
Both 
respect 
Both  not 
respect 
Child Labour (CLij)  0.035  2.323***  -2.216** 
Forced Labour (FLij)  0.016  0.415  -0.551 
Discrimination (Disij)  0.038**  1.789***  -1.985*** 
Freedom  of  Association 
(FAij) 
-0.033  1.070*  -1.062* 
*** : 1%; ** : 5%; *** : 10% 
Social distance is only significant for discrimination. The coefficient of respect-no 
respect dummies are coherent with the results found at the aggregated level (table 1, 
column 6). Two labour standards (Child Labour, Discrimination) are highly significant 
what is not the case for Forced Labour. Freedom of association is poorly significant 
even with the same signs. If countries violating labour standards tend to export more to 
complying countries, this fact is mainly due to child labour and discrimination at work 
and, less clearly, to Freedom of association. 
Social distance takes the value 1 (same index), 2, 3, 4 or 5. An alternative to quantify 
the  influence  of  social  distance  is  to  introduce  4  dummies  variable  for  each  score, 
except 1, which will be the reference (close countries). Table 3 only shows the results 
for the variable of interest. It confirms that social distance has low effects on trade but 
with interesting result for child labour. Child labour differences acts positively till 3 and 
increasingly negative for higher differences. We can also note that discrimination is no 
longer significant.  
 










Freedom  of 
association 
2  0.148**  0.030  -0.093  0.043 
3  0.088  -0.183**  0.042  -0.102 
4  -0.250**  0.110  0.079  0.019 
5  -0.772***  0.174  0.121  -0.240 
*** : 1%; ** : 5%; *** : 10% 
The previous estimations were only concerned by bilateral exports. They tried to 
quantify the influence of the level of compliance with labour standards on geographical 
specialization of countries. However, they tell nothing of very clear about the volume of 
trade with all countries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) consider that export and 
import fixed effects are good proxies for the “multilateral resistance” under what the 
bilateral trade is not only influenced by “dyadic” variables affecting the couple, but also 
by  idiosyncratic  variables  which  are  specific  to  a  country  but  affecting  all  bilateral 
relations. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) consider that fixed effects reduce the risk of 
endogeneity. They include all omitted variables having an idiosyncratic dimension. 
In a second step we then regress export and import fixed effects extracted from the 
gravity model. The first issue is to choose the “preferred” gravity equation. Following 
the recent literature, we consider that ZIP is the most confident method of estimation. 
Because the social distant (socdistij) is never significant we exclude this equation (table 
1, column 4) and choose the equation estimated in the table 1-column 6. Theoretically, 
fixed effects are drained from bilateral effects of labour standards. However, the index 
is  built  from  the  combination  of  unilateral  variables.  We  have  then  extracted  fixed 
effects from a gravity equation letting aside bilateral indexes of labour standards as a 
useful source of comparison.  
We  introduce  some  unilateral  variables  GDPi,  population  (popi)  and  remoteness 
(landlocked countries: landlocki). Usually, population is barely significant but we prefer 
to keep in order to control for economic development because:  
 ln (GDP/pop) +  .ln(GDP) = (  +  ).ln (GDP) –  .ln (pop) 19 
 
A variable contributing to higher fixed effects (lower multilateral resistance) is pro-
trade. To validate the hypothesis of “social dumping”  as instrument of a successful 
mercantilist  strategy  of  “export-led  growth”,  low  labour  standards  are  expected  to 
contribute  to  increase  exports.  Concerning  imports,  expectations  are  not  so  clear 
because  social  dumping  might  also  be  an  instrument  to  protect  the  country  from 
imports. However, mercantilism implies also facilitations for imported goods devoted to 
transformation for final exports, what is typically the case of free or special trade zones, 
frequently criticized about their social behaviour. 
We first regress the value of the aggregated index (Agindexi) by OLS (table 4). The 
index varies from 0 (no compliance) to 1 (full compliance). We also test a non-linear 
(parabolic) relation. 
The regression using fixed effects which are extracted from a gravity model without 
bilateral labour standards only gives significant results in the non-linear relation with 
import effects: more compliance with labour standards increases import-openness till a 
threshold of 0.65. 
When fixed effects are drained from mutual respect of labour standards, results are 
more significant as well as linear as non-linear specifications. Improvements of labour 
standards  tend  to  decrease  import  and  export  openness.  Improvements  of  labour 
standards tend to decrease import and export openness. More precisely, following the 
non-linear relation, the improvement increases exports and imports only till the low 
threshold of 0.36 and 0.45 respectively.   20 
 






Gravity model without bilateral labour standards  Table 1, column 6 




























































-0.046  -0.08  -0.057  -
0.098**  Ln(popi) 
(1.32)  (1.43)  (2.67)  (3.14)  (0.57)  (1.01)  (1.13)  (2.28) 









(1.45)  (1.45)  (4.65)  (4.83)  (1.43)  ‘1.51)  (3.97)  (4.78) 









**  Agindexi 
(0.66)  (0.74)  (1.41)  (3.42)  (4.20)  (2.02)  (4.64)  (5.64) 











































    137    137    137  137 
R
2  0.87  0.87  0.95  0.95  0.83  0.85  0.91  0.94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** : 1%; ** : 5%; *** : 10% 
 
Once again, we have to deep the analysis taking into account the different influence 
of each standard. It is quite frequent to note a non linear relation between institutional 
variables (democracy, corruption, inequalities...) and the endogenous macroeconomic 21 
 
variables  (growth2,  trade3,...).  Then,  we  have  regressed  the  fixed  effects  with  each 
labour  standards  varying  from  1  (total  compliance)  to  5  (total  disrespect)  one  time 
assuming a linear relation, the second time assuming a non linear (parabolic) relation. 
Note that, comparatively with the previous table, the interpretation of the sign must be 
inversed:  a  negative  sign  would  mean  that  more  compliance  with  labour  standards 
would boost trade (exports or imports). Labour standards are separately regressed. 
Results are much contrasted.  
The more robust relation is with forced labour in linearity as well as non-linearity. 
More a country uses forced labour, more this country trades. If we consider the non-
linear relation, the effect is inversed (lower standards = lower trade) at the threshold of 
3.38 for exports and 3.60 for imports.  
For  freedom  of  association,  evidences  are  different  for  export  and  import  fixed 
effects. Concerning the exports, the linear relation behaves well with a positive and 
significant sign (lower standard-higher exports) and the non linear does not work. The 
linear  relation  is  also  significant  for  imports  but  the  non-linear  regression  highly 
improves the quality of the test (F, R
2) with once again a U-inversed relation at the 
threshold of 3.88. Amongst countries scored 4 we find Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco (and 
many Mediterranean countries), Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, etc.  
Table  5  –  Impact  on  trade  of  the  compliance  with  each  labour  standard  (fixed  effects) 
 
  Export fixed effect  Import fixed effect 
0.031  0.922***  0.040  0.953***  Child Labour (CL) 









  (3.36)    (5.92) 
0,177***  0,994***  0,144***  0,626***  Forced Labour (FL) 
(2.60)  (3.30)  (3.44)  (3.34) 
                                                 
2 For example : Barro (1996), Bazillier and Sirven (2008) 





  -0,087** 
Forced Labour (FL
2) 
  (2.78)    (2.64) 
0,094*  -0.152  0.120***  0,249  Discrimination (Dis) 
(1.72)  (0,51)  (3.58)  (1.38) 
  0.040    -0.021  Discrimination (Dis
2) 
  (0.85)    (0.73) 
0.310***  0.582**  0.144***  0.675***  Freedom  of  Association 
(FA)  (4.89)  (2.05)  (3.47))  (3.74) 
  -0.045   
-
0.087*** 
Freedom  of  Association 
(FA
2) 
  (0.98)    (3.01) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** : 1%; ** : 5%; *** : 10% 
The relation between trade and child labour is clearly of a U-inversed type with the 
threshold of respectively 2.92 and 2.94; amongst countries at the “quasi-maximum” of 
3: Bolivia, China, India, Morocco, Brazil, Vietnam i.e. the emerging countries what 
means that lower standards would contract trade. 
Only  the  linear  specification  gives  significant  results  for  discrimination  with  a 
positive relation: more discrimination-more trade. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
In progress 
The empirical conclusions that violating labour standards has a positive impact on 
exports imply that developing countries which adopt a growth strategy based on foreign 
trade may be tempted to violate labour standards, especially in certain sectors or in 
certain places - namely, within free trade zones. 23 
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